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Introduction 
Until quite recently, industrial-organization  econ- 
omists, bank regulators, and the Justice Depart- 
ment shared the view that market structure, that is, 
the number and size distribution of competitors in 
a market, is the primary determinant of the con- 
duct and performance of banks operating in that 
market. More particularly, the traditional structur- 
alist view is that the greater the share of the mar- 
ket controlled by the largest competitors or, 
alternatively, the higher the market concentration, 
the greater the likelihood that the firms will be 
able to agree collusively to raise prices above 
costs and so earn supranormal or monopoly 
profits. 
Concentration and bank profitability 
have been found to be positively related in a 
number of empirical studies, and these findings 
have been interpreted by structuralists as evi- 
dence that their position is correct.' 
The presumption that the structur- 
alist view is valid is reflected in the Justice 
Department's merger guidelines,  which are used 
by regulators to identify bank acquisitions and 
mergers likely to have anti-competitive effects. In 
essence, the guidelines generally proscribe bank 
regulators from approving acquisitions and 
mergers that would cause market concentration 
to rise above an assumed critical collusion- 
facilitating level. 
.......................................... 
I  1  See. for example, Rhoades (1982). 
In the 1980s, however, a number 
of legal, regulatov, and technological develop- 
ments and additional theoretical and empirical 
work have raised questions about the appropri- 
ateness of  using the structuralist paradigm as a 
basis for antitrust policy. In particular, the grow- 
ing importance of potential competitors in an 
increasingly deregulated environment has been 
emphasized by critics of the traditional view.2 
Other critics have suggested that 
the positive relationship between concentration 
and profitability found in previous empirical stud- 
ies may not be attributable to collusion and does 
not necessarily indicate unidirectional causation 
running from structure to performance.3 They 
suggest  that  performance  determines  market 
structure rather than the reverse. One author has 
dubbed this the "efficient structure" hypothesis.* 
Superior efficiency, management, or luck cause 
firms to be profitable and to increase their market 
share, resulting in market concentration. Market 
share, a proxy for relative firm efficiency, is thus 
positively related to profitability. The positive 
relationship between concentration and profita- 
bility is spurious and simply reflects the correla- 
tion between market share and concentration. 
For a discussion of these developments and their implications,  2  see  McCall and  McRdyen (1986)  See  also the wok  on contest- 
able market theory in Baumol, et al. (1982) and the discussion of Ihe 
structuralist view in Brozen (1982). 
1  3  See  Demsetz (1914) and Smirloc (1985) 
14  Smirlock, op. cit. 
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This study represents an attempt to 
provide additional insight on the nature of the re- 
lationship between market structure and bank per- 
formance. Specifically, the relationship between 
bank profitability and concentration will be exam- 
ined using recent data for a sample of 191 institu- 
tions drawn from non-metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) counties in Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
In the following section, some criti- 
cisms of the traditional view will be discussed 
and previous empirical studies will be briefly 
reviewed. Next, the data and sample design will 
be discussed. In the fourth section, the data will 
be analyzed in several ways. Finally, a summary of 
the results and conclusions will be presented. 
I.  Problems with the Traditional View 
The traditional structuralist view reflects several 
implicit assumptions that appear to be question- 
able. The first is that creating and enforcing tacit 
collusive agreements is relatively easy. For a col- 
lusive agreement to be stable, participating firms 
must institute some mechanism to set and adjust 
price(s) and allocate market shares. This is not a 
trivial exercise, particularly for banks, which are 
multiproduct firms selling complex, heterogene- 
ous products and services in a number of differ- 
ent geographic markets. 
The second is that technological 
conditions, regulation, other barriers to entry, or 
the threat of predation allow colluding firms in 
concentrated markets to disregard potential com- 
petitors. Concentration-related monopoly power 
and profits can exist and persist only when entry 
by potential competitors can be effectively pre- 
vented by incumbent firms. In recent work, theo- 
rists have demonstrated that when barriers to 
market entry and exit are low, or a market is con- 
testable, it is possible to have outcomes approx- 
imating those of perfect competition even if  the 
number of actual competitors is quite small or 
concentration is high.5 
Geographic and product market 
barriers to competition faced by banks and other 
financial intermediaries admittedly were formid- 
able prior to the 1980s. Price competition was 
constrained by interest rate ceilings on deposits 
and on some types of loans as well. However, 
this situation has changed dramatically in the past 
few years. Intrastate and interstate barriers to geo- 
graphic expansion by commercial banks and by 
savings and loan institutions (S&Is) have been 
removed in a large number of states. Remaining 
barriers have been circumvented in various ways 
15  See  Baurnol, et al., op.  cit 
(with loan production offices and nonbanking 
holding company subsidiaries, for example). The 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St 
Germain Act of 1982 essentially allow S&ls to 
offer all the financial products and services of 
commercial banks. Largely unregulated nonbank 
financial companies also now compete aggres- 
sively for both loan and deposit customers of 
banks. In addition, the increasing sophistication 
and declining cost of computer and telecommu- 
nications technology have made it possible for 
financial institutions to compete effectively in a 
geographic area without an extensive investment 
in brick and mortar offices. Financial intermediar- 
ies also now are basically free to compete on a 
price as well as a nonprice basis. 
These developments have made it 
much easier for banks and other types of 
financial-services providers to compete for cus- 
tomers in any given local loan or deposit market. 
The implication is that market structure may not 
be the primary determinant of bank performance 
in the current environment. 
11.  Review of Previous Empirical Studies 
Comprehensive reviews of structure-performance 
studies in banking published prior to 1984 have 
been done by Rhoades (1982) and Gilbert (1984). 
Although the two authors reviewed many of the 
same studies, their evaluation of the empirical 
evidence differs considerably. The former con- 
cluded that the results suggest that bank market 
structure influences both profit and price perfor- 
mance in the manner predicted by the structural- 
ist paradigm. The latter concluded that the results 
do  not consistently  support or reject the hypothe- 
sis that market concentration influences bank per- 
formance. Both concur that where a significant 
positive concentration impact on prices or profit- 
ability was found, the magnitude of the impact 
was typically slight. Gilbert emphasizes that the 
positive impact does not necessarily imply that 
collusion is the cause. 
More recent studies of the structure- 
performance relationship have been done by 
Burke and Rhoades (1985), Smirlock (1985), 
Smirlock and Brown (1986), and Whalen (1986). 
Burke and Rhoades explore the relationship 
between bank profitability averaged over the 
1980-84 interval and the number of  bank compet- 
itors faced using a national sample of more than 
7600 institutions. First, they calculate and com- 
pare mean profit rates for sample banks operating 
in 1-bank, 2-bank, 3-bank and 4-bank non-MSA 
markets and MSA  markets and find results con- 
sistent with the traditional structuralist view. The 
mean profitability of banks in 1-bank markets is 
significantly greater than the means of the other 
classifications. Consistent results were found for 
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the other non-MSA markets (that is, mean returns 
in 2-bank markets are above those in markets 
with a larger number of competitors, and so on). 
Burke and Rhoades also explore the relationship 
between their profitability variable and a binary 
market structure variable (equal to one for MSA 
banks, equal to zero otherwise) using regression 
analysis. Additional nonstructural control varia- 
bles are also employed in the regression. Again, 
the results are in line with the traditional view. 
The estimated coefficient on the market structure 
variable is negative and significant, indicating 
banks operating in urban markets with large num- 
bers of competitors are less profitable than rural- 
market banks facing four or fewer competitors. 
The authors conclude that the re- 
sults suggest "...banks  in monopolistically or oli- 
gopolistically structured markets likely pay lower 
rates on deposits, charge higher rates on loans 
and services, or both  ... [suggesting] that out-of- 
market and limited-purpose competitors do not 
provide effective competition to banks in highly 
concentrated markets. Such markets are appar- 
ently not contestable probably because barriers to 
entry exist in real-world markets."b 
Although the results were inter- 
preted by the authors as support for the traditional 
structure-performance view, alternative explana- 
tions for the findings exist. In particular, the sig- 
nificant differences in mean returns may be largely 
due to temporary regional differences in economic 
activity rather than differences in the number of 
competing banks faced in local markets. Mean 
returns were calculated for each sample bank 
over the 1980-84 interval. Over the first three 
years of this period, the energy and agricultural 
sectors were booming. As a result, banks located 
in agricultural and energy-producing states were 
highly profitable. Coincidentally, many of these 
states have restrictive geographic branching laws 
and so have a relatively large number of local 
markets with few competing banks. Thus, it is 
possible that local economic conditions rather 
than the number of competitors are responsible 
for the observed differences in mean bank profit- 
ability in the sample. 
In the regression analysis, the 
authors attempt to control for other factors 
thought to impact bank profitability. However, 
several potentially important variables were not 
included and may have affected the reported 
results. In particular, no thrift-presence variable 
was employed even though S&b  possessed 
much the same powers as banks after 1982. Also, 
a bank-market-share variable was not employed. 
As noted above, it has been argued by some that 
the positive relationship between profitability and 
market concentration found in empirical studies 
is spurious and will not be evident if differences 
in market share are taken into account.' 
Finally, it is not clear that the report- 
ed results suggest that potential competition is 
unimportant. The mean returns used in the t-tests 
are computed for each market type using all such 
banks in the sample. That is, banks in each 
class are pooled regardless of differences in state 
branching laws. Since differences in bank branch- 
ing restrictions should have an important impact 
on the intensity of potential competition, the 
mean-profitability test results do not provide any 
insight on the potency of this force. In fact, the 
regression results do provide support for the 
hypothesis that potential competition is impor- 
tant. Specifically, the two state branching dum- 
mies included in the estimated equation (for unit 
banking and limited branching states) have posi- 
tive significant coefficients, indicating that bank 
profitability is higher in states with branching 
restrictions. 
Smirlock (1985) uses regression 
analysis to investigate the profitability- 
concentration relationship using a sample of 
more than 2,700 banks drawn from unit-banking 
states in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. The 
relationship was examined for a single year, 1978. 
In essence, the study represents an attempt to 
determine if a positive concentration-profitability 
relationship remains evident when a bank-market- 
share variable is also included in the estimated 
equation. If  it does, it suggests that the traditional 
view is the correct one. If  not, and if the market- 
share variable is significant, it suggests that the 
"efficient structure" hypothesis is correct. The 
market structure variable used was the three-bank- 
concentration ratio. The market-share variable is 
each bank's share of commercial bank market 
deposits. Several other additional common con- 
trol variables are also employed. 
Smirlock concludes that the regres- 
sion results support the efficient structure rather 
than the traditional concentration-collusion view. 
Market share is positively and significantly related 
to profitability even when concentration is includ- 
ed in the estimated equation. However, he finds 
a significant positive concentration-profitability 
relationship only when the market-share variable 
is omitted from the estimated equation. When 
both are included, the coefficient on the concen- 
tration variable becomes insignificant. 
.......................................... .......................................... 
I  6  Burke and  Rhoades (1985). p.  I I.  I 7 See  the discussion in SrnirIock. op. cit  pp 70-71. 
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(1986) paper,  additional empirical evidence in sup- 
port of the efficient structure hypothesis is pre- 
sented. The same sample of banks is used to esti- 
mate several variants of a profit function. If  the 
traditional concentration-collusion hypothesis is 
valid, the expectation is that secondary or fringe 
firms will act as price-setters. Conversely, if the ef- 
ficient structure hypothesis is valid, the fringe 
firms should act as price-takers. Leading firms may 
act as price-setters under either hypothesis. The 
profit function can be, and is, used to test whether 
a firm is a price-setter or price-taker.  The estima- 
tion results indicate that leading firms exhibit 
price-setting behavior, while secondary "fringe" 
firms act as price-takers, regardless of market 
concentration. Further, there is no evidence that 
collusion increases with market concentration. 
The study by Whalen (1986) repre- 
sents a simple attempt to examine the relation- 
ship between the number of banks competing in 
a market and bank profitability for a sample of 
banks drawn from Ohio and Pennsylvania over 
the 1976-85 interval. The study was designed to 
provide insight on whether potential competition 
had become an effective disciplinary force over 
the past decade. Both states liberalized their 
bank-branching laws over the period of observa- 
tion. Further, thrifts are an important force in 
both states, and possessed essentially all the 
powers of  banks after 1982. Thus, barriers to 
competition were presumably lower at the end of 
the period than they were at the outset. 
Following the approach of Burke 
and Rhoades, sample banks were classified 
according to the number of competing banks 
faced in the market. Three classes were created 
for non-MSA banks: 1-3 competing banks, 4-6 
competing banks, and 7 or more competing 
banks. A separate class was created for MSA 
banks. Mean returns were calculated for the 
banks in each class for three subperiods: 1976-78, 
1979-81,  and 1982-85.  If the traditional 
concentration-collusion hypothesis is valid, the 
mean profitability of banks operating in highly 
concentrated markets should be significantly 
higher than for banks operating in markets with 
larger numbers of actual competitors in each of 
the three subintervals. 
Empirical support for the traditional 
view was found only in the first time period, be- 
fore relaxation of either state's bank branching 
laws and the expansion of S&L asset and liability 
powers. The findings suggest that the lowering of 
barriers to actual and potential competition during 
the last two subintervals largely eliminated any 
concentration-related impact on bank profitability. 
Thus, researchers have found sup- 
port for the concentration-collusion hypothesis in 
only one of the four most recent empirical studies 
of the structure-performance relationship in bank- 
ing.8 Further, it is not clear that the results of this 
one supportive study demonstrate that the higher 
profitability observed in concentrated markets is 
due to collusion. A deficiency of all of the studies 
is that the market presence of thrift institutions is 
not taken into account. 
111.  Sample and Methodology 
The structure-performance relationship is reex- 
amined in this study, using a sample of 191 non- 
MSA  banks located in Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
Non-MSA banks are studied because potential 
competition should be relatively weak in such 
areas, and so the sample is likely to provide evi- 
dence in favor of the concentration-collusion 
hypothesis-if it is in hct valid. 
The relationship is investigated 
over the 1982-84 interval. This period was chosen 
for several reasons. Bank branching restrictions in 
both states were liberalized by early 1982. 
Further, the 1982 Gam-St Germain Act had given 
S&ls essentially the same asset and liability pow- 
ers as commercial banks. Both of these develop- 
ments should have intensified potential as well as  5 
actual competition in local banking markets in 
both states. Thus, the sample may indicate if 
these developments, in conjunction with techno- 
logical changes in the funds-information transfer 
area, have rendered rural banking markets 
contestable. 
The particular banks analyzed were 
selected in the following way. In each state, all 
single-market banks in continuous operation over 
the 1976-85 interval headquartered in non-MSA 
counties were included. Single-market banks are 
those with all their offices located within their 
home ofice county. The presumption is that non- 
MSA  counties approximate ml  banking markets. 
The sample must be restricted to single-market 
banks so that market structure can be related to 
profits earned in that market. 
The profitability measure employed 
is annual return on assets (net income after taxes, 
before securities transactions, divided by average 
total assets) averaged over the 1982-84 interval. 
.......................................... 
8 
Two other interesting studies provide evidence that market con- 
centration need not result in anticompetitive bank performance. 
Hannan (1979) finds a significant relationship between a potential 
entrant variable and the rate paid on savings deposits in local markets in 
Pennsylvania. Shaffer (1982) obtains estimates of  the elasticity of bank 
gross revenue with respect to input prices and concludes that the results 
indicate that the banking markets he studied are neither perfectly com- 
petitive nor monopolistic. He finds that the coefficient on a concentration 
variable in his estimated equation is insignificant and concludes that the 
competitive forces preventing monopolistic conduct were primarily polen- 
tial rather than actual or  that the concentration  measure did not ade- 
quately proxy actual competition. 
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Mean ROA  by Market Concentration Level 
(Banks only) 
Market concentration  Mean ROA  S.D. ROA  T-Stat 
HHI <  1800 (N=62)  1.179  0.529  1.89 
HHI >  1800 (N=129)  1.015  0.621 
HHI <  2000 (N=71)  1.171  0.512  1.95 
HHI >  2000 (N=120)  1.001  0.635 
HHI <  2500 (N=104)  1.116  0.599  1.22 
HHI >  2500 (N=87)  1.011  0.591 
HHI <  3000 (N=133)  1.101  0.591  1.15 
HHI >  3000 (N=58)  0.992  0.606 
HHI <  3500 (N=155)  1.078  0.602  0.51 
HHI >  3500 (N=36)  1.023  0.575 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations, based on Reports of Income and Condition, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Resenre System; and on Summary of De- 
posit Data, FDIC. 
- 
TABLE  1 
The deposit data for the sample banks and the 
non-MSA markets comes from the FDIC Summary 
of Deposits tape. 
The deposit data were used to gen- 
erate Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes (HHI) of 
market concentration for the sample banks, both 
excluding and including S&ls.7 Others have used 
Mean ROA by Market Concentration Level 
(Banks and S&Ls) 
Market concentration  Mean ROA  S.D. ROA 
HHI <  1800 (N=  109)  1.094  0.594  0.70 
HHI >  1800 (N=82)  1.033  0.600 
HHI <  2000 (N=129)  1.100  0.598  1.09 
HHI >  2000 (N=62)  1.001  0.590 
HHI <  2500 (N=153)  1.087  0.599  0.90 
HHI >  2500 (N=38)  0.991  0.585 
HHI <  3000 (N=170)  1.055  0.618  -1.27 
HHI >  3000 (N=21)  1.173  0.368 
HHI <  3500 (N=180)  1.061  0.607  -1.08 
HHI >  3500 (N=ll)  1.190  0.368 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations, based on Reports of Income and Condition, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and on  Summary of De- 
posit Data, FDIC. 
TABLE  2 
The  HHI index is the sum of  the squared market shares of  firms 
competing in a market. The  HHI takes on its maximum value of 
10,000 in monopoly markets. 
1  10 
The three-firm-concentration ralio is typically employed. 
Stated reasons for its use are ease of computation and 
alternative concentration measures for various 
reasons.I0 The HHI was employed because this is 
the measure used by the Justice Department and 
the bank regulatory agencies in implementing 
antitrust policy in banking. 
The relationship between concen- 
tration and bank profitability is investigated in 
two ways. First, mean returns are calculated for 
the sample banks after the sample has been split 
into two concentration categories-"high"  and 
"low"--that are defined in a variety of ways. If  the 
concentration-collusion hypothesis is correct, the 
mean return of the high-concentration class 
should be significantly greater than that of the 
low-concentration class. 
Since this approach does not con- 
trol for other factors that may impact bank profit- 
ability, regression equations similar to those 
employed by others are also estimated. The defi- 
nitions of the variables employed in the regres- 
sions appear in the appendix. Specifically, the 
bank profitability variable was regressed on a 
measure of bank size, a multibank holding com- 
pany (MBHC) affiliation dummy, a market-size 
variable, market deposit growth, and the S&L 
share of total market deposits, in addition to bank 
market share and market concentration. 
The traditional view implies that the 
estimated coefficient on the market-concentration 
variable should be positive and significant when 
other independent variables are included in the 
equation, including a firm market-share variable. 
The bank-size variable is included 
to determine if larger banks realize scale econo- 
mies or have diversification opportunities not 
available to smaller competitors. If  size does 
confer advantages, the sign of the estimated coef- 
ficient should be positive. 
If MBHC a131iation  allows subsidiary 
banks to realize performance advantages relative 
to independent competitors, the estimated coeffi- 
cient of the MBHC dummy should be positive. 
The market-size variable is included 
because rural markets in the sample vary greatly in 
size. It has been suggested that this variable prox- 
ies ease of market entry. If  this is the case, the ex- 
pected sign of the coefficient should be negative. 
The market-growth variable is em- 
ployed to proxy the strength of demand for bank- 
ing services in each market relative to supply. 
Rapid market growth suggests robust demand, 
and so the estimated coefficient on this variable 
is expected to be positive. 
The S&L variable is used to proxy 
the intensity of nonbank competition in each mar- 
ket. Presumably, the higher the S&L share of mar- 
ket deposits, the greater their competitive impact 
and the lower the level of bank profitability. 
tendency to exhibit the significant positive relationship between concen- 
tration and profitability  predicted by structuralists. 
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Regression Results' 
Independent variables 
Equation  HB  MSB  BSize  Mkt  MG  SLS  MBHC  Constant 
'The  dependent variable in each equation is bank return on assets averaged over the 1982-84  interval. 
SOURCE: Author's calculations, based on Reports of Income and Condition, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and on 
Summary of Deposit Data, FDIC. 
TABLE 3 
IV.  Results 
Mean returns for the sample banks, broken down 
by concentration class, appear in table 1. The 
concentration measures in table 1 are calculated using 
only the commercial banks operating in the mar- 
ket. The first dichotomy, using HHI equal to 1800 
as the breakpoint, reflects the  Justice Department's 
definition of a highly concentrated banking mar- 
ket, presumably prone to collusion.  The other break- 
downs represent an attempt to determine if  there 
is some higher level of market concentration at 
which supranormal bank profits become evident. 
The results do not support the 
concentration-collusion hypothesis. In particular, 
for all breakdowns examined, mean profitability 
is higher for banks in the low-concentration class. 
T-tests indicate that the observed differences in 
mean returns are statistically significant for the 
HHI=1800 and HHI=2000 breakdowns. 
The results differ somewhat if S&Is 
are considered. These results appear in table 2. 
Once again, for HHI breakdowns up to 2500, mean 
returns are higher for the low-concentration class 
than they are for the more concentrated one. 
When the HHI breakpoint is 3000, mean returns 
are higher for banks in the more-concentrated 
class. However, none of the differences in mean 
returns are statistically significant. Thus, the 
results do  not support the traditional view. 
The regression results are presented 
in tables 3 and 4." Once again, the concentration- 
collusion hypothesis is not supported. Instead, 
the results mirror those of Smirlock and suggest 
that the efficient structure view is the correct one. 
Specifically, whether S&Ls are included in the 
concentration and market-share calculation or 
not, the concentration variable has a negative, 
insignificant coefficient when the market-share 
variable is excluded ftom the estimated equation. 
When a market-share variable is also employed,  7 
the concentration-variable  coefficient remains 
negative and becomes significant. The estimated 
coefficient on the market-share variable is con- 
sistently positive and significant in equations with 
and without a concentration variable. 
These results are not sensitive to 
the concentration measure employed. When the 
three-firm concentration ratio is used, similar 
results are obtained, both when thrifts are 
included and excluded. 
The reasons for the negative, sig- 
nificant coefficient on the concentration variable 
in several of the estimated equations are unclear, 
although a similar result was reported in Smirlock 
(1985). One possible explanation is that non- 
price competition may be more intense in more 
concentrated markets and so bank profitability is 
lower. Another is that managers in more concen- 
trated markets can more easily engage in 
expense-preference behavior and so bank costs 
in such markets are higher and profitability is 
lower.12 Some researchers have suggested that 
managers in concentrated markets will limit the 
amount of risks they take (i.e., choose the "quiet 
life") and so could earn lower returns.l3 Other 
.......................................... 
A formal test was conducted to determine if it was appro-  1  1  priate to pool the Ohio and Pennsylvania banks. The calcu- 
lated F-statistic was roughly 0.50, which is well below the critical level, 
and so pooling was deemed acceptable. 
For a discussion of  expense-preference behavior, see  1  2  Edwards (1977). 
The  possibility that managers might opt for  the "quiet life" in 
concentrated markets is explored in Heggestad (1977). 
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Regression Results* 
Independent variables 
Equation  HS  MSS  BSize  Mkt  MG  SIS  MBHC  Constant 
'The  dependent variable in each equation is bank return on assets averaged over the 1982-84 interval. 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations, based on Reports of Income and Condition, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and on 
Sum-  of Deposit Data, FDIC. 
- 
TABLE  4 
explanations exist.14 Additional research appears 
necessary to explain this finding  and is beyond 
the scope of  the present paper. 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
The empirical results obtained using this sample 
of  non-MSA banks do not support the 
concentration-collusion  hypothesis. That is, a 
strong positive relationship between market con- 
centration and bank profitability was not detected 
using either type of statistical analysis. Instead, 
the findings are in line with those reported in 
Smirlock (1985). That is, bank market share was 
found to be positively and significantly related to 
bank profitability both when concentration was 
included in the estimated regressions and when 
it was not. In fact, in equations that included both 
variables, the concentration variable had a nega- 
tive, significant coefficient, rather than the 
expected positive one. The fact that the results 
closely mirror those of Smirlock, despite the 
much smaller sample size and different time 
period, with S&Is excluded and included, lends 
credence to the view that the efficient structure 
hypothesis is the correct one. 
The results suggest that high 
market concentration is unlikely to lead to collu- 
sion and monopoly profits, at least in states that 
allow banks some freedom to branch. The impli- 
cation is that a purely structuralist antitrust policy 
should be tempered with judgment, particularly 
in the determination of critical tolerable concen- 
tration levels. 
.......................................... 
1  14  See SmirlM (1985). p 78, foolrate  18. 
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DEFINITION OF VAFUABLES 
HB: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market con- 
centration, defined using commercial banks only. 
HS: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market con- 
centration, defined using both commercial banks 
and S&k. 
MSB:  Bank share of commercial bank deposits in 
the market. 
MSS:  Bank share of total bank and thrift deposits 
in the market. 
BSIZE: Bank total deposit size. 
MKT: Total bank and thrift deposits in the market. 
MG:  Percentage change in total market deposits, 
1980-84. 
SIS: S&L share of bank and thrift market deposits. 
MBHC: Dummy variable equal to one if  a bank is 
a member of a multibank holding company, 
equal to zero otherwise.  All variables, unless other- 
wise noted, are calculated using June 1984 data. 
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